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Atmospheres seem to be everywhere. They are a central part of everyday life. We make decisions 
about who to spend time with, what to put on our walls, and where to eat based on atmospheres 
we associate with people, things, and spaces. In this way, atmospheres shape our experience and 
behavior. However, the link between atmospheres and agency has been relatively underexplored 
in the philosophical literature. Much of the debate instead concerns the nature of atmospheres, 
what sort of things they are.  
This focus on the ontology of atmospheres is a rich and philosophically substantive area of work. 
However, in what follows, I argue that it potentially overlooks important insights into the 
regulative power of atmospheres, that is, their capacity to shape the things we do and the ways we 
connect (or fail to connect) with others. Atmospheres do things. They actively shape experience 
and behavior—and crucially, they open up (or close down) forms of social connectedness. They 
do these things, I argue further, because atmospheres don’t merely provide affective color or 
texture. They also furnish possibilities—possibilities that help or hinder us as we find our way in 
the world. I unpack this claim by considering atmospheres as “affective arrangements” (Slaby, 
Mühlhoff, and Wüschner 2017). Along the way, I develop a distinction between “atmospheres of 
inclusion” and “atmospheres of exclusion,” and I apply this distinction to two case studies: Sara 
Ahmed’s critical phenomenology of “stopped bodies,” and social difficulties in autism. Both of 
these cases, I conclude, help to highlight the deep connection between atmospheres and agency.      
Preliminary Remarks 
We often speak of atmospheres as though they pick out some well-defined entity—a quality, 
feature, attribute, or presence that attaches to the people, things, and spaces we encounter in 
everyday life. We talk about the tranquil atmosphere of a spring morning or lush park. A child can 
radiate an atmosphere of boundless curiosity, hope, innocence, and enthusiasm. The family dog 
can seem trusting and earnest or skittish and twitchy. A piece of music might emanate a somber 
or uplifting atmosphere. A classroom can feel lively and inclusive, or threatening and closed-off 
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to open inquiry. Some may experience a family dinner as authentic, loving, spontaneous, and 
warm; for others, it might feel grim and stilted. Homes, workplaces, churches and temples, 
restaurants, heritage sites, sports venues, stores, clubs, museums, theaters, factories, music venues, 
parks, cities, persons, activities, and communities—among many other things—are all said to have 
distinctive atmospheres.  
When we speak of atmospheres in everyday life, we generally don’t simply take an aesthetic 
interest in them the way, say, we might view a work of art (although we can, of course, consider 
atmospheres from a purely aesthetic point of view). Our interest tends to be more concrete. This 
is because atmospheres aren’t causally inert. They pervade everyday life in ways that shape our 
evaluations and behavior. In this way, they can be said to have practical significance.  
For example, we might avoid courses taught by a prickly professor who, despite their technical 
brilliance and international prestige, creates a notoriously unpleasant classroom atmosphere. We 
may skip a restaurant with well-prepared food because we don’t like the colorless or out-of-date 
atmosphere (although such an atmosphere may, for some, be an attractive part of its quirky or 
kitschy charm), or routinely work in a coffeehouse with middling coffee because we like the cosy 
atmosphere and find it conducive to working. The key point—important for what follows—is that 
atmospheres do things. They envelope us, press upon us, and in so doing play an important role in 
shaping how we evaluate and get on in the world. They help or hinder as we “find our way,” as 
Sara Ahmed (2006) puts it.   
Yet, despite the ease with which we speak of atmospheres and their presumed ubiquity, there is, 
nevertheless, surprisingly little consensus about what atmospheres are. Atmospheres are now 
increasingly discussed in a variety of disciplines and debates, from architectural studies, aesthetics, 
and management studies to psychology, geography, anthropology, and sociology (see Osler and 
Szanto (this volume) for a helpful overview). Discussions are also on the rise in philosophy, as the 
present volume attests. However, despite this increased attention, there is still widespread 
recognition that atmospheres are “slippery” phenomena (Böhme 1993), difficult to pin down with 
ontological precision. Part of this slipperiness comes from the fact that, as we’ve already noted, 
atmospheres traverse distinctions between people, things, and spaces (Anderson 2009). It’s 
possible that most things could be described as atmospheric.    
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The way we talk about atmospheres in both academic discourse and everyday life highlights this 
ontological ambiguity. On the one hand, atmospheres are often spoken of as though they have a 
mind-independent reality. They are said to be out in the world, features of the natural and built 
environment that “seem to fill the space with a certain tone of feeling like a haze” (Böhme 1993, 
113–114). This way of speaking has led some to characterize atmospheres as “quasi-objective” 
(Böhme 2006) or “quasi-things” (Griffero 2014). Similarly, Schmitz (2019) characterizes 
atmospheres as a kind of pre-personal affectivity that circulates through public spaces. However, 
there is, on the other hand, also recognition that atmospheres are experiential phenomena; they are 
felt. It seems puzzling to think of an atmosphere as existing somehow out in the world without the 
presence of a subject (or subjects) who feel it. Additionally, the descriptive richness and specificity 
of atmospheric qualities we ascribe to people, things, and spaces—e.g., serene, homely, strange, 
stimulating, holy, melancholic, uplifting, depressing, pleasant, moving, inviting, erotic, collegial, 
open, sublime, etc. (Böhme 1993)—highlights the fact that atmospheres are, in some important 
sense, modes of encounter (Osler 2021). They are ways that, as embodied subjects, we experience 
our world, as well as our relation to that world and the people in it. In this way, atmospheres seem 
to sit uneasily between purely subjective or objective characterizations (Slaby 2019).      
I have neither the interest nor the ability to sort out this ambiguity in what follows. Again, this is 
because my focus is not so much on what atmospheres are but rather what they do. I am specifically 
concerned with the interrelation between atmospheres and agency. The latter, as I use the term 
here, encompasses both action and affect. Atmospheres do things by animating and regulating 
actions at both individual and collective levels. They also animate and regulate affective 
experiences—again, at both individual and collective levels. Atmospheres do this regulative work 
by opening up—and also closing down—possibilities for emotional experience, behavior, and 
social connection.  
In light of my focus on agency, I will adopt a relational conception of atmospheres. Atmospheres, 
as I think of them, are tied to the world; they are rooted in features of the natural and built 
environment. These natural, structural, and organizational features are what make certain kinds of 
atmospheric experiences—including the emotional expression and behavior that are part of these 
experiences—possible. They are what give bits of the world a distinctive “tone of feeling.” 
However, these features are, on their own, insufficient to generate atmospheres. Bits of the world 
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may be configured in ways that are poised to potentially generate atmospheric experiences. But 
atmospheres only arise if subjects are also present and poised to potentially engage with them in 
some way. Atmospheres, as I speak of them, are intrinsically experiential. Again, it is telling that 
many of our descriptions involve phenomenal concepts. We try to get a grip on the vagueness and 
ontological ambiguity of atmospheres by tracing them back to how we experience and live through 
them. When describing atmospheres in everyday life, we tend to describe both features of the 
world as well as our felt connection to those features.    
Atmospheres as Affective Arrangements 
With that background in place, I now turn to a more focused consideration of atmospheres and 
how they relate to agency. I will try to side-step some of the ontological puzzles mentioned above 
by thinking about atmospheres in the context of recent interdisciplinary approaches to situated 
cognition—and more precisely, situated affectivity (e.g., Colombetti and Krueger 2015; 
Colombetti and Roberts 2015; Griffiths and Scarantino 2009; Krueger 2014b; Saarinen 2020; 
Slaby 2014; Stephan, Walter, and Wilutzky 2014; von Maur 2021). For these situated approaches, 
moods, emotions, and other forms of affective experience are driven, manipulated, and sustained—
over multiple timescales—by features of an individual’s social and material environment. 
Accordingly, a full account of emotions, for example, cannot be given by focusing on the 
individual alone (i.e., their brain, central nervous system, or even their body and its expressive 
capacities). This is because the people and things an individual interacts with transforms her 
emotional capacities in fundamental ways. Bodies fit into, and become dynamically “coupled” 
with, resources in their environments (e.g., tools, technologies, props, practices, other people) in 
ways that animate and regulate their emotional experience and behavior (Colombetti 2016). The 
ongoing input and support of these environmental resources—such as portable music listening 
technologies, which are powerful tools for on-demand emotion-regulation (Krueger 2014a)—
allows her to realize otherwise inaccessible forms of experience and expression.    
Within this situated context, Slaby and colleagues have recently developed the concept of 
“affective arrangements” (Slaby, Mühlhoff, and Wüschner 2017). For my purposes, affective 
arrangements are kinds of atmospheres. They determine both the overall feel or affective tonality 
of specific locales, as well as what sort of emotion-driven behavioral and social possibilities are 
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present (or absent) within those locales.1 Affective arrangements are made up of “ensembles of 
diverse material forming a local layout that operates as a dynamic formation, comprising persons, 
things, artifacts, spaces, discourses, behaviors, and expressions in a characteristic mode of 
composition and dynamic relatedness” (4). Affective arrangements come in many forms and 
degrees of intensity. They are nearly ubiquitous in everyday life. And they encompass a range of 
diverse phenomena: things like corporate work environments (from factories to white-collar work 
to stock market trading floors), public transportation, street corners, commercial environments 
(shopping malls, sports stadiums), organizational settings like classrooms, lecture theaters, and 
worship spaces, as well as both the ritualistic practices that unfold within these myriad spaces 
(ceremonial regimes like Christmas, Ramadan, election campaigns, birthday parties, baptisms, 
funerals, etc.), along with the artifacts that support these practices (5).    
The key idea here is that affective arrangements shape the form and dynamics of how bodies 
feelingly fit into—and come to feel at home within—the part of the world these arrangements carve 
out.2 They do so by actively regulating the emotional experiences and behavior of the individuals 
who inhabit them. In this way, affective arrangements modulate our agency; they shape how we 
feel and find our way, including how we find our way alongside others. They have this powerful 
regulatory impact on us, Slaby and colleagues argue, because affective arrangements are “always 
in operation, always “on.” It is the ongoing, “live” affective relations within the arrangement that 
constitutes zones of higher relative intensity compared to what is outside” (6). So, dynamic styles 
of bodily comportment and performative emotional expression appropriate in, say, a raucous pub 
or restaurant during a night out with friends will not fit into the more sober and serious affective 
arrangement of a corporate office, mosque, or academic lecture hall. Bodily styles welcome in the 
former will be actively discouraged in the latter. Accordingly, insofar as we are sufficiently 
responsive to the norms running through these different arrangements, transitioning from one to 
the next will actively modulate our agency and affect.  
 
1 Slaby and colleagues are hesitant to use the term “atmosphere” for some of the reasons I describe above. Moreover, 
they say that on some, but not all occasions, the overall affective dynamics that make up affective arrangements can 
be aptly described as affective atmospheres (ibid., footnote 24). However, it’s not clear to me that an affective 
arrangement, under their characterization, can fail to generate some sort of atmospheric properties. Even an affective 
arrangement that, for whatever reason, fits together in a discordant or incongruous way will nevertheless still have an 
overall unifying feel or affective tonality—an atmosphere. So, I will use “affective arrangements” and “atmospheres” 
in roughly the same way, even if that departs from Slaby et. al’s precise usage.   
2 Michelle Maise (2018) has recently explored similar themes with her rich analysis of the interrelation between social 
institutions and embodied “habits of mind”.  
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There is another important point to be made. In dynamically shaping our experience and behavior 
this way, affective arrangements also shape the character and intensity of the kinds of interpersonal 
connections we develop within these arrangements. Affective arrangements open up—and in ways 
explored below, close down—social possibilities, ways to connect and share with others.  
For example, in her ethnographic work on work cultures, Melissa Gregg observes that increased 
emphasis on the affective value of “intimacy” in white-collar work relationships has, among other 
things, led to a willingness to open up one’s home and personal life to work colleagues and 
professional responsibilities. This opening up occurs when we buy into—or are pressured to buy 
into—the importance and practice of full-time connectivity. Gregg found that: 
 
[T]he social bonds developed between co-workers in the office are a contributing 
factor in extending work hours. Loyalty to the team has the effect of making extra 
work seem courteous and common sense…[even] when loyalties lie not with the 
organization or even necessarily the job, but with the close colleagues who are the 
main point of daily interaction (Gregg 2011, 85) 
 
Via always-on communication technologies like smartphones, email, and chat apps, we feel an 
immediate—and intimate—sense of connectedness with work colleagues. If we have a question 
or request, we know that we can almost always get a prompt response. But this felt intimacy does 
not simply arise from the practical ease with which we exchange information. It also arises, Gregg 
argues, from the affectively saturated experience of “presence bleed”: the experience “whereby 
the location and time of work become secondary considerations faced with a “to do” list that seems 
forever out of control” (2). We respond to email over the weekend, see other colleagues engaging 
in work activities in real-time (via active email threads, shared documents, etc.), and feel 
compelled to be a loyal and supportive team member. So, we join in. The experience of presence 
bleed in this way generates a local instantiation of a workplace arrangement now embedded in our 
home, no longer confined to the walls of the office.  
This local arrangement modulates our agency. Even during our “down time,” we feel anxious and 
compelled to quickly respond to email exchanges before we get left out of decision-making 
processes. And it also modulates our emotions. We feel urgency to participate, anxiety when we 
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don’t (of if we’re delayed), and guilt, remorse, and a sense of disloyalty for letting team members 
down if we take the weekend off while pings on our phone remind us that work is pushing forward 
without us. 
As this example indicates, affective arrangements bring bodies into social alignment with one 
another (even when those bodies are physically dispersed). They coordinate patterns of shared 
experience and behavior. This alignment happens not only because arrangements furnish material 
resources (e.g., always-on communication technologies) to make this happen. They also generate 
and maintain normative expectations that orient bodies within a given material arrangement (i.e., 
they determine what to do, and how and when to do it), as well as signal approval or disapproval 
for the way a given body is falling into line—or, conversely, failing to do so (e.g., via giving or 
withholding promotion or access to VIPs and higher-ups within the organization).  
In this way, arrangements feelingly orient the bodies they come into contact with. This orientation 
helps bodies fit into their world in different ways. This alignment can be a good thing, such as the 
way affective arrangements of a nightclub, worship space, or rehab facility can bring bodies into 
intense modes of connectedness and shared experience that promote wellbeing. However, as the 
previous example indicates—and as I examine in more detail below—affective arrangements can 
also have a disorienting effect. They may scaffold the development of unhealthy habits, practices, 
and forms of self-experience (Maiese and Hanna 2019). One reason for this is that affective 
arrangements are fundamentally porous. They often bleed into other spaces and arrangements in 
ways that leave bodies disturbed, restless, unsettled, or on-edge—that is, feeling not fully at-home 
wherever they happen to be (Slaby 2016).     
To sum up, the notion of “affective arrangements” is useful here for several reasons. First, it 
helpfully captures the dynamic and relational conception of atmospheres I endorsed above. Within 
affective arrangements like workplaces, museums, gambling casinos, and rehab facilities, 
individuals are, quite literally, actively arranged. Bodies act on their local arrangements and the 
resources they furnish in order to regulate their experience and behavior. However, these same 
arrangements, in turn, act on them. As we’ve seen, the sociomaterial and normative configuration 
of an arrangement “brings multiple actors into a dynamic, orchestrated conjunction, so that these 
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actors’ mutual affecting and being affected is the central dimension of the arrangement from the 
start” (Slaby, Mühlhoff, and Wüschner 2017, 5).  
Second, the notion captures the way that affective arrangements are both fixed and open-ended. 
As the presence bleed example indicates, affective arrangements may begin in one location, such 
as a specific workplace. However, material resources (e.g., Internet-enabled communication 
technologies) allow them to expand their ambient range. Affective arrangements can infiltrate a 
variety of other arrangements; in so doing, they adapt over time and take on new forms. In this 
way, arrangements are performatively and temporally open-ended. Working from home will 
involve performative dynamics different from those found between office walls (e.g., responding 
to email while making dinner or watching a movie on the couch). The normative form and force 
of a given arrangement can, in this way, remain relatively fixed even while its performative 
dynamics fluidly evolve and adapt in context-specific ways. 
Third, as the previous point indicated, affective arrangements are nested phenomena. One 
arrangement can fit into the general contours of another. A local instantiation of a workplace 
arrangement, for instance, can spring up at home within the contours of a domestic arrangement. 
Again, this is because they are fluid and adaptable. Much of their regulative power and potency 
therefore comes from their capacity to infiltrate and spring up within pre-existing arrangements. 
As we’ve seen, this can be a good thing. It can help bodies feel at home in the world. A gay 
Christian, for example, my find comfort and support in certain online communities and spaces that 
are not available to her in her offline world. This online support may, in turn, help her feel more 
at home as she navigates intolerance in her offline world. She can access it on an as-needed basis. 
Online worlds are kinds of affective arrangements that often bleed into and infiltrate our offline 
experiences and behavior.3 But as we’ve already seen, affective arrangements can also have a 
negative impact. They can disturb and disorient bodies, and dramatically limit or close down 
possibilities for action and social connection. Affective arrangements have political consequences. 
I turn to a more focused consideration of these themes now.   
 
 
3 Although I don’t discuss the Internet here, online spaces can function as affective arrangements. See, e.g., Osler 
(2020), Krueger and Osler (2019), and Osler and Krueger (forthcoming) for more discussion, including a discussion 
of why the “online/offline” distinction is increasingly less tenable.   
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Atmospheres of Inclusion and Exclusion  
I now turn to a more focused consideration of the idea that affective arrangements allow bodies to 
extend and fit into them in specific ways. I will do so by exploring how certain arrangements are 
configured in ways that do not afford an easy “fitting into” for certain kinds of bodies. Such 
arrangements disorient certain kinds of bodies and, in so doing, disturb their sense of embodiment, 
agency, and affect at a deep level. They place bodies in a state of perpetual discomfort. As we’ll 
see, sometimes this discomfort is intentional; sometimes it’s not. This focus on disorientation and 
discomfort will open up yet another way of thinking about how atmospheres do things in and to 
the bodies that inhabit them. Two examples will be illustrative: Sara Ahmed’s critical 
phenomenology of disorientation and “stopped” bodies, and a phenomenological approach to 
social difficulties in autism.   
We spend our days finding our way through different kinds of affective arrangements. As we’ve 
seen, many arrangements are designed to make us feel at home in the world. They orient us and 
help us find our way by guiding and shaping our emotions and sense of bodily agency. Moreover, 
these arrangements have an important social function. They create what we might refer to as 
atmospheres of inclusion.  
Atmospheres of inclusion are designed to bring people together, to coordinate their experiences 
and behavior, and in so doing enrich and intensify their sense of interconnectedness. They help us 
find our way to and with others. The affective arrangement of a worship space like a cathedral, for 
instance, may furnish resources for solitary experiences like quiet prayer, reflection, and 
confession. However, other aspects of this arrangement are deliberately configured to bring people 
together: from ritualistic and liturgical practices (singing, chanting, reciting the Nicene Creed), to 
myriad visual markers (icons, paintings, baptismal fonts, gravestones) and organizational features 
of the nave and other spaces. All of these things collectively remind individuals that they share a 
common space; they are participating in a historical affective arrangement shaped by a rich 
tradition of practices and experiences undertaken by people with shared beliefs. In other words, 
this arrangement helps people find their way through a shared religious form of life. 
So, atmospheres of inclusion not only make us feel at home in an individual sense. They also make 
it clear that we are at home in a world with others. Part of their orienting function is to provide 
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cues that ours is a landscape of shared arrangements that bodies can together fit into and take shape 
in. This important social-regulative work that affective arrangements do is often so pervasive and 
subtle that it is transparent to us. It is easy to overlook and take for granted. However, there are 
occasions when we do become acutely aware of it and the social possibilities it presents. Often, 
this happens when we lose access to it. We become aware of the social and regulative character of 
affective arrangements when, as we try to find our way, we become disoriented. 
I’ve already used the term “disorientation” at several points in the discussion. To clarify. I’m using 
it in a similar way to Ahmed (2007). Disorientation involves a kind of discomfort, a feeling of not 
knowing how to find one’s way. But the experience of disorientation I’m referring to involves 
more than just getting lost because one lacks the relevant information, such as when we try to 
navigate a new city for the first time, follow an academic talk when we don’t know the relevant 
literature, or even the disorientation and irritation we feel when puzzling our way through a 
philosophical problem. These are cases of epistemic discomfort. They involve the “irritation of 
doubt,” as Peirce says, that “causes a struggle to attain a state of belief” (quoted in Tschaepe 2021, 
2).  
Cases of epistemic doubt are an important part of everyday life. They motivate us to do things in 
order to learn about ourselves and the world more generally. Accordingly, they often have a bodily 
or behavioral dimension. If I’m unfamiliar with the layout of a city, I can use a map, smartphone, 
or ask a local for help finding my way. If I don’t know how to fix a sink, I can watch YouTube 
videos or call a plumber. However, in contrast to epistemic discomfort, what I have in mind here—
again, following Ahmed—is something slightly different: a richer felt sense that one is no longer 
able to find one’s way. And to continue with a theme discussed previously, a central part of its 
character involves a kind of bodily discomfort. More precisely, it is a kind of bodily discomfort 
that can be present even in the absence of epistemic discomfort.   
By “bodily discomfort” I do not mean to suggest that his discomfort is necessarily tied to a specific 
sensation or part of one’s body (e.g., a sore throat, muscle cramp, or irritation that one’s shirt 
doesn’t fit quite right). Nor is it necessarily tied to illness—although the discomfort of illness can, 
like the discomfort I am concerned with, make us feel deeply at odds with both our body and the 
surrounding environment (Carel 2016; Svenaeus 2019).  The bodily discomfort and disorientation 
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I have in mind is rather a global sense of not feeling at home in a particular space—feeling, that 
is, somehow bodily out of sync with or affectively unsettled within the arrangement one happens 
to occupy at that moment. This experience is multidimensional, and comes in different intensities, 
degrees, and durations (Tschaepe 2021). For example, a new hire may initially feel bodily out-of-
sync with the rhythms, practices, and expectations of the office until they’ve settled in and “learned 
the ropes.” We may walk into a party alone, quickly scan the room, and suddenly feel bodily 
disoriented by the sweep of unfamiliar faces.    
Despite the differences in how this experience may manifest, this felt loss of at-home-ness is a 
phenomenological indication that one is no longer finding one’s way. If I suddenly realize that I 
don’t know anyone at the party, I may feel my social possibilities abruptly dissolve and be unsure 
what to do next. Indeed, these experiences may be uncomfortable. But feeling disoriented on the 
first day of work or when walking into a party full of strangers is a privileged form of disorientation 
that can be overcome with relative ease (e.g., spending a few days settling into the office; having 
a stranger come over and introduce you to other partygoers). This is because these arrangements 
are, for the most part, organized to generate atmospheres of inclusion. It may take some time for 
certain bodies to sort out how best to fit into them. But these arrangements are nevertheless 
designed to support and enable this process.   
In other contexts, however, the discomfort of bodily disorientations can be much more intense and 
have significant practical and political consequences. Critical phenomenologists are helpful for 
understanding how so. Critical phenomenologists incorporate insights from feminist theorists, 
critical race theorists, queer theorists, decolonial and indigenous scholars, and others to highlight 
the ethical and political significance of traditional phenomenological debates (Salamon 2018; 
Weiss, Salamon, and Murphy 2019). Some critical phenomenologists have explicitly drawn our 
attention to powerful connections between bodily discomfort, disorientation, and the politics of 
space—that is, the profound, and potentially devastating, consequences of ensuring that certain 
kinds of bodies (e.g., non-white bodies, queer bodies) are not allowed to comfortably find their 
way into and through certain kinds of arrangements (e.g., Fanon 1986; Ahmed 2006, 2007; Yancy 
2016). This is because certain arrangements are configured to deliberately generate what we might 
refer to as atmospheres of exclusion. Atmospheres of exclusion constrain certain kinds of bodies, 
hinder their agency and emotions, and in so doing disturb them at a pre-reflective level. 
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Non-white Bodies and Atmospheres of Exclusion4 
Sara Ahmed has developed a rich analysis of the environmental manipulations and bodily 
dynamics that generate what I’m calling “atmosphere of exclusion.” She develops her analysis by 
drawing our attention to the constitutive relation between body and space. As she repeatedly 
emphasizes, the character of our pre-reflective bodily experience is bound up with space—and 
more precisely, with specific features of the affective arrangements we inhabit. By “pre-
reflective,” phenomenologists like Ahmed refer to the fundamental ways we experience our body 
and its capacities for movement, expression, and action (i.e., our felt sense of agency) (Colombetti 
2014). Our body is implicitly present as we perceive and act on the world; it shapes what we 
experience and how we experience it without our explicit attention from one moment to the next. 
Ahmed tells us that “the body is habitual insofar as it ‘trails behind’ in the performing of action, 
insofar as it does not pose ‘a problem’ or an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’ by ‘what’ 
the action encounters…the habitual body does not get in the way of an action: it is behind the 
action” (Ahmed 2007, 156). Accordingly, how we feel at home in the world rests on the character 
of how our bodily experience anchors us in space, including the affective arrangements we inhabit. 
Ahmed’s special contribution is to draw attention to how spaces and arrangements deprive us of 
at-home-ness by placing us in a state of disorientation.    
Atmospheres of exclusion generate experiences of disorientation. They hinder certain bodies from 
finding their way. Ahmed observes that “[f]or bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social, 
bodily movement is not so easy” (Ahmed 2007, 161). In support of this claim, she develops a 
phenomenology of “being stopped,” as she puts it. Black activism, Ahmed notes, highlights the 
many ways that policing involves a “differential economy of stopping”. Some bodies—mainly 
non-white bodies—are stopped by the police more than others: e.g., being pulled over while 
driving, or harassed while trying to enter their own home. But being stopped often occurs in other 
(i.e., non-policing) contexts, too, such as when non-white bodies are bombarded with racist images 
or memes in online spaces, followed by suspicious neighbors in gated communities, or passed over 
for a job despite having equivalent (or better) qualifications than white candidates. 
 
4 The discussion in this section and the next has been adapted and expanded from analysis in Krueger (forthcoming). 
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A key insight here is that this stopping doesn’t just place practical constraints on stopped bodies 
by depriving them of access to certain things and spaces (although it does). It also has significant 
phenomenological consequences: it induces a perpetual bodily disorientation, a disturbance of that 
stopped body at a pre-reflective level. This is because the persistent threat of being stopped isn’t 
an abstract or ephemeral thing. It is materially encoded within different affective arrangements 
designed specifically to unsettle and disorient certain bodies. A stark example is the proliferation 
of “Whites Only” and “Colored” signs once found above drinking fountains, waiting rooms, 
toilets, restaurants, and swimming pools across the American landscape well into the 20th century. 
The prevalence of these signs not only signaled that non-white bodies were not allowed to access 
the practical resources they offered. They also indicated a lack of social possibilities. Non-white 
bodies were deliberately deprived of possibilities to connect and share, that is, to feel as though 
they were participatory members of a common history and community.5 
Of course, there are many more contemporary examples. Some are obvious, such as the 2020 
killing of George Floyd, an unarmed African American man killed by the police after allegedly 
passing a counterfeit bill in a Minneapolis grocery store. Floyd’s death under the knee of a police 
officer inaugurated protests throughout the US and beyond, calling for a change to institutions, 
practices, and arrangements that systematically devalue and target non-white bodies. However, 
sometimes this stopping is more subtle; it occurs within arrangements that are supposed to be 
welcoming and inclusive. These cases reinforce the idea that affective arrangements are porous 
and nested. Atmospheres of exclusion can spring up within contexts that, on the surface, appear to 
actively cultivate atmospheres of inclusion.  
Ahmed gives us an example. She talks about the experience of walking into a room and 
experiencing it as a malleable affective container (Ahmed 2014, 224). A non-white body can enter 
into a room full of academic feminists, for instance, and experience a global change in the affective 
tonality of the room. Even in an academic space one might think would be particularly open and 
inviting, a non-white body can still have the experience of being stopped. Ahmed quotes bell 
hooks’ description of this experience: “A group of white feminist activists who do not know one 
another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. They may feel bonded on the basis 
 
5 It is often assumed that these signs were confined to the South. But this is not the case — and some could still be 
found throughout various parts of the US into the 1970s (Abel 2010). 
Forthcoming in Atmospheres and Shared Emotions, ed. Dylan Trigg. Routledge. 
14 
of shared womanhood, but the atmosphere will noticeably change when a woman of color enters 
the room. The white women will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory” (quoted 
in Ahmed 2014, 224).    
In this case, the overt reaction of the other bodies (i.e., becoming suddenly tense, less celebratory) 
makes it clear that the non-white body will not be able to seamlessly fit into the contours of this 
arrangement. Moreover, part of the bodily disorientation non-white bodies feel is not simply due 
to the feeling that their presence puts other bodies on edge, that is, that they are somehow 
affectively out-of-sync with these other bodies and not fully at home. It also arises from the 
recognition that they are the ones who must now work to make others comfortable with their 
arrival. As Ahmed puts it, “[t]hose who do not sink into spaces, whose bodies are registered as not 
fitting, often have to work to make others comfortable. Much of what I have earlier called 
‘diversity work’ is thus emotional work” (24). This emotional work extracts a bodily toll.6   
As these examples indicate, moving through atmospheres of exclusion—pervaded by the persistent 
threat of being stopped—leaves traces on stopped bodies (Ahmed 2007, 158). These traces are 
present not only when stopped bodies inhabit acutely threatening spaces, such as being pulled over 
by the police. It endures when they move on to other spaces, too. As Fanon observes, this is because 
stopped bodies are perpetually “surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty” (Fanon 1986, 
83). Can I use this toilet? Why did that police car slow down as it drove by? Why did those white 
feminist scholars stiffen up when I entered the room? Why are the diners at the next table staring 
at me? Why is this security guard following me as I shop? For both Fanon and Ahmed, no space 
is entirely free from the threat of being stopped. As a result, “[t]hose who get stopped are moved 
in a different way” as they find their way through the world (Ahmed 2006, 162). They are 
disoriented at a pre-reflective bodily level, insofar as they are never allowed to fully extend and 
take shape within everyday arrangements white bodies take for granted. 
Ahmed says that her Muslim name similarly disrupts her bodily experience. It slows her down as 
she finds her way through the world. This is because her body is continually marked as “could be 
Muslim,” which is, in turn, immediately translated into “could be terrorist.” She is thus haunted 
by an atmosphere of exclusion that follows her wherever she goes—simply because she has the 
 
6 As we’ll see, people with autism sometimes describe a similar experience. 
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“wrong” kind of name. This experience has bodily consequences: “[h]aving been singled out in 
the line, at the borders, we become defensive; we assume a defensive posture, as we ‘wait’ for the 
line of racism, to take our rights of passage away” (163). Ahmed’s non-white body is brought into 
line with other non-white bodies also marked with “terrorist” names. In being singled out and made 
to wait, government authorities make clear that to be a non-white body in the west “is to be not 
extended by the spaces you inhabit” (163). Rather, it is to be made to feel continually out-of-sync 
with—disoriented by and within—those spaces and the atmosphere of “certain uncertainty,” the 
atmospheres of exclusion, that pervades them. 
Ahmed’s analysis is useful for many reasons. Among other things, it provides us with a rich 
phenomenological account of how certain bodies are made to feel perpetually disoriented by the 
structure and character of different affective arrangements they inhabit in everyday life. She draws 
particular attention to the way that affective arrangements, and the atmospheres of exclusion they 
generate, have political consequences. Equipped with this critical phenomenological framework, 
we can now turn to a consideration of disorientation and atmospheres of exclusion in autism 
Autistic Bodies and Atmospheres of Exclusion 
How does the previous analysis relate to autism? In short, autistic bodies are often stopped bodies. 
They are not allowed to fully extend into and take shape within the spaces they inhabit—affective 
arrangements organized primarily around the form of neurotypical bodies. This experience of not 
fitting in, of being hindered from finding their way, can lead autistic persons to experience a kind 
of pre-reflective bodily disorientation within these arrangements which, in turn, informs and 
intensifies some of their social difficulties. This claim has significance for understanding the nature 
of some social difficulties in autism as well as potential intervention strategies. These cases are 
also helpful for taxonomic reasons. They provide an example of arrangements that can generate 
atmospheres of exclusion, but which may do so (unlike some of Ahmed’s examples) in ways that 
are unintended by those responsible for them.7   
 
7 I here follow the terminological preferences of neurodiversity proponents who, by endorsing identity-first language 
(“autistic persons”) instead of person-first language (“individuals with autism”), deliberately stress the connection 
between cognitive styles and selfhood (Pellicano and Stears 2011). 
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First, some brief background. Autistic people often struggle to communicate with others, become 
attuned to their emotions and intentions, and flexibly adapt to changing social environments. The 
still-dominant way of thinking about these social difficulties is the neuro-cognitive perspective 
(Chapman 2019, 422). According to this perspective, autistic differences can be explained by 
neurocognitive differences found in all autistic individuals. These differences rest on a diminished 
capacity for mentalizing, or cognizing the existence of other minds, when compared to 
neurotypicals (Baron-Cohen 1995). This mentalizing deficit causes difficulties interpreting and 
predicting others’ behavior, and smoothly integrating with the shared practices that make up 
everyday life.      
Recently, challenges to this neuro-cognitive perspective have surfaced from a number of fronts. 
They argue for a more holistic and multidimensional approach. Despite their other differences, 
these challenges collectively argue that adopting a neurocognitive perspective overlooks key 
embodied, interactive, relational, and developmental processes that are partly constitutive of 
autistic styles of thinking, expressing, and sharing emotions and experiences (Bizzari 2018; De 
Jaegher 2013; Schilbach 2016; Krueger and Maiese 2018; Roberts, Krueger, and Glackin 2019). 
Looking at experiences of disorientation and being stopped in autism can help make the 
importance of some of these processes clearer, as well as what role these relational factors play in 
shaping some social difficulties.   
There is now growing sensitivity to how autistic persons use their bodies to move through the 
world, express emotions, and respond to the people, things, and spaces around them (Doan and 
Fenton 2013). Instead of focusing exclusively on cognitive traits, they refocus on distinctive ways 
autistic persons pre-reflectively experience and live through their bodies as they use their bodily 
agency to organize sensory information and negotiate shared spaces (Boldsen 2018; Donnellan, 
Hill, and Leary 2012). Neuro-cognitive perspectives say little about bodily experience in ASD. 
But understanding the role of the body is crucial for understanding how autistic people find their 
way through everyday arrangements.  
From a neurotypical perspective, ASD styles of embodiment can seem unusual or strange. The 
timing and flow of their movements may seem somehow off or contextually inappropriate. People 
with ASD may have an unusual gait or posture. And they sometimes have movements, tics, and 
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habits (e.g., rocking, hand-flapping, spinning, exaggerated gestures, etc.) that neurotypicals find 
strange. They may also repeatedly shrug, squint, pout or rock back and forth; repeatedly touch a 
particular object; turn away when someone tries to engage with them; maintain an unusual or inert 
posture; appear “stuck” in indecisive movements for an uncomfortably long period of time; have 
trouble imitating actions; or require explicit prompts to perform an action.  
These distinct styles of embodiment aren’t simply apparent from a third-person vantage point, 
however. First-person reports suggest that people with autism pre-reflectively experience their 
body from the inside in ways that are different from neurotypical experience. The character of 
these anomalous bodily experiences shapes their distinctive behavior which can, in turn, lead to 
difficulties fitting into neurotypical arrangements. 
For example, reports indicate that people with autism often experience difficulties with 
movements. This includes controlling, executing, and combining movements—from fine motor 
control, grip planning, and anticipatory movements, to more complex actions like gesturing, 
reaching for a book, dancing, or negotiating a crowded hallway (Eigsti 2013). Sometimes this 
feeling results not just from measurable coordination difficulties but also from a felt sense of 
diminished agency and bodily control—including a sense that one’s body has a mind of its own, 
particularly when stressed or overstimulated: “I had an automatic urge to touch my body — rub 
my thighs or my stomach and chest” (Robledo, Donnellan, and Strandt-Conroy 2012, 6). At other 
times, individuals with ASD report difficulty feeling their limbs in relation to one another and 
space (Blanche et al. 2012). This spatial difficulty can make it difficult to smoothly interact with 
the environment. To cope, some individuals seek sustained deep pressure or joint compression to 
regain a felt sense of bodily integrity (Leary and Donnellan 2012, 60). Strategies include lying on 
the floor under a mattress or sofa cushions, jumping on the floor or bed, wearing multiple layers 
of clothing, banging fists on hard surfaces, or sitting in a plush recliner, bathtub, or swimming pool 
in order to have the experience of being touched over their entire body. 
So, how does all this relate to atmospheres of exclusion? The key point is this: these anomalous 
bodily experiences can lead people with ASD to feel as though their unique styles of embodiment 
do not smoothly integrate with neurotypical arrangements, including patterns of interaction and 
normative expectations comprising these arrangements. Some of the causal factors responsible for 
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these anomalous bodily experiences likely reside within the neurophysiology of the individual. 
However, some of these factors also appear to be social: individuals have the experience of being 
“stopped” by structures and norm-governed character of neurotypical arrangements. Accordingly, 
this sense of being stopped feeds into and intensifies aspects of their pre-reflective bodily 
disorientation when they inhabit and try to negotiate these spaces.     
We can let people with ASD describe their own experiences of being stopped, as well as the feeling 
of bodily disorientation that ensues.8 One individual says that, “I was sitting on the floor and when 
I got up after looking at a couple of books, my friend said I got up like an animal does”—and 
further, that although she is aware that her bodily style differs from those of neurotypicals, she 
remains unsure of how it differs, exactly (Robledo, Donnellan, and Strandt-Conroy 2012, 6). 
Another says that she will often “lose the rhythm” required to perform actions involving two or 
more movements, and that “[e]verything has to be thought out” in advance (6), which she is aware 
gives her movements an excessively stiff and unnatural quality. This felt disconnection both from 
her own body, along with a sense that she is rhythmically out-of-sync with the neurotypical people 
and arrangements she inhabits — and judged negatively because of this — cause frustration. It 
also deepens her sense of bodily disorientation: “I have been endlessly criticized about how 
different I looked, criticized about all kinds of tiny differences in my behavior…No one ever tried 
to really understand what it was like to be me…” (6). For many people with ASD, negotiating 
neurotypical arrangements involves negotiating an “atmosphere of certain uncertainty,” as Fanon 
puts it. These arrangements are not set up to accommodate or be responsive to non-neurotypical 
styles of embodiment and expression. This can lead to the feeling that one is always about to be 
negatively impacted or judged for not settling into the bodily dynamics of these spaces in a 
comfortably familiar (i.e., neurotypical) way.  
There are many more reports like these (see Leary and Donnellan 2012). They suggest that autistic 
bodies struggle to extend themselves into arrangements organized around the form, and norms, of 
neurotypicals people and practices. Forms of engagement, expression, and sharing acceptable 
within ASD forms of life are often actively discouraged and negatively evaluated within 
neurotypical arrangements. This pervasive resistance gives rise to experiences of atmospheres of 
 
8 Chapman (2019) observes that first-person reports of autistic people are often left out of philosophical and 
psychological discussions of autism (p.426).   
Forthcoming in Atmospheres and Shared Emotions, ed. Dylan Trigg. Routledge. 
19 
exclusion. These atmospheres limit bodily possibilities for people with ASD. Additionally, they 
shape their feeling of being bodily stopped. This resistance might be acutely felt when negotiating 
the material structure of different neurotypical arrangements such as a noisy, brightly lit lecture 
hall, restaurant, or retail space that negatively impacts an individual’s auditory and visual 
hypersensitivity. But it can also be felt in different ways within interpersonal contexts, too. 
Consider delayed responses in conversation. Autistic people are often thought to struggle with the 
back-and-forth flow of conversations. Yet, Donnellan and colleagues found that twelve young 
adolescents with minimal verbal skills, all of whom were labelled developmentally disabled or 
autistic, could offer competent conversational responses—but only, on average, after fourteen 
seconds of silence (Leary and Donnellan 2012, 57). Most neurotypicals would find this slower-
paced rhythm awkward. It would alter the character of that interaction in an unfamiliar way (i.e., 
for neurotypicals), and they would probably change the subject or leave the conversation 
altogether. 
Consider another conversational example: when someone is asked a question like “Do I look good 
in this shirt?”9 An autistic person might see this question as fact-seeking and give an honest and 
direct answer (“No, you do not”). However, sensitive attunement to the broader context in which 
it is asked might show that the asker is actually seeking not information but affirmation (“Sure, 
you look great!”), or at least honest but gentle critical feedback (“Hmm, not bad, but perhaps we 
can find a more flattering color”). So, a direct and honest answer from an autistic person might be 
met with confusion, a hurt reaction, and lead to conflict—all of which they may find puzzling and 
disorienting. Repeated experiences of this sort may discourage them from future engagements. 
They further intensify the sense that neurotypical arrangements create atmospheres that perpetually 
exclude them.  
Note, however, that this lack of social sensitivity and feeling of fitting in cuts both ways. As 
McGeer notes, people with ASD may be “blind to our minds, but so too are we blind to theirs” 
(McGeer 2009, 524). Seeing how so helps to further highlight the spatial origin of some social 
impairments in ASD. For example, within autistic spaces, it is normal and acceptable for autistics 
to avoid eye contact when speaking to someone. Within neurotypical spaces, however, people who 
 
9 This example is taken from Chapman (2019, p.430). 
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do this are often seen as deceptive or dishonest. Similarly, neurotypicals may find rhythmic 
patterns of “self-stimulation” (or “self-stims”)—hand-flapping, finger-snapping, tapping objects, 
repetitive vocalizations, or rocking back and forth, etc.—socially off-putting, and view them as 
meaningless behavior. Indeed, treatment programs (often developed with little input from autistic 
people) have traditionally tried to suppress or eliminate them (Azrin, Kaplan, and Foxx 1973). Yet, 
for many autistic people, self-stims are embodied strategies for managing sensory information and 
finding their way. They may use them to refocus and self-regulate when information threatens to 
be overwhelming (hypersensitivity), or when they require heightened arousal in order to access 
further information (hyposensitivity). While people with ASD may be actively discouraged from 
bodily extending themselves via these strategies within neurotypical spaces, they nevertheless 
have the freedom to do so within autistic arrangements where their meaning and salience is 
recognized.10    
The takeaway lesson is that many of the social difficulties autistic people exhibit are context 
sensitive. They are the result of atmospheres of exclusion arising from neurotypical arrangements 
not adequately configured to accommodate diverse styles of bodily being-in-the-world. These 
atmospheres are the source of much of the bodily disorientation people with ASD feel in their 
everyday life. Tellingly, these same social difficulties do not arise when people with ASD inhabit 
autistic arrangements—atmospheres of inclusion—where these bodily practices are viewed as 
acceptable strategies for finding one’s way. As one autistic person tells us: “If I socialize with 
other Aspergians of pretty much my own functionality, then all of the so-called social impairments 
simply don’t exist...we share the same operating systems, so there are no impairments” (Cornish 
2008, 158). Reports like these are supported by studies indicating that while high-functioning 
autistic people may feel anxiety and encounter difficulties interacting with non-autistic people, 
they nevertheless find their interactions with other autistic persons efficient and pleasurable 
(Schilbach 2016; see also Komeda et al. 2015). Again, the latter are governed by ASD-friendly 
norms, expectations, and social possibilities that allow them to bodily extend into those 
arrangements in ways they cannot when they inhabit many neurotypical spaces. 
 
10 Observations such as these helps explain why the Internet is so important for providing spaces for autistic people to 
develop online arrangements governed by autistic norms, vocabularies, and styles of expression (Hacking 2009). See 
Osler (forthcoming) for a phenomenological discussion of how the lived body can enter online spaces and be 
empathically available to others within those spaces. 
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Conclusion  
I’ve argued that atmospheres do things. They have a profound regulative power to actively shape 
experience, behavior, and forms of social connection. This regulative power, I’ve argued further, 
comes from the fact that atmospheres do more than just provide affective color or texture to the 
world. They also furnish possibilities: ways to act on the world, ways to fit into the spaces and 
arrangements we negotiate, alone and with others, throughout everyday life. What I’ve termed 
“atmospheres of inclusion” and “atmospheres of exclusion,” applied to Sara Ahmed’s critical 
phenomenology of stopped bodies and social difficulties in autism, can show how atmospheres 
both help and hinder as we find our way. 
To be clear, none of the above should be read as suggesting that the ontological focus 
characterizing many ongoing philosophical discussions of atmospheres is a waste of time. It’s not. 
For, despite their ubiquity in everyday life, atmospheres remain an elusive phenomenon. Clarifying 
their nature therefore remains a philosophically useful project. Instead, this analysis should be read 
as a reminder that atmospheres make a concrete difference in our lives. This is true not just in 
terms of enhancing our aesthetic and emotional experience. They also allow us to fit into our world, 
to feel at home in it (or, as we’ve seen, become disoriented). In other words, they have a profound 
political and ethical significance worthy of ongoing philosophical attention. Resources from 
critical phenomenology can help us find our way through some of these issues.  
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